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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Smrz appeals, contending the district court made two different errors in his case.
First, he asserts the district court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence of a specific, remote
instance of conduct to impeach the credibility of a fact witness over his objection. As such, this
Court should vacate his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
Second, Mr. Smrz contends the district court abused its discretion by unduly limiting its
sentencing discretion when it told him, by statute, it could only consider probation if he
participated in the presentence report. That misreads the relevant statute and applicable case

law, which are clear that the necessary written report can be provided without input from the
defendant. Since the district court went into the sentencing hearing with this unduly-narrowed
view of its discretion even though a written report was prepared, this Court should at least vacate
Mr. Smrz's sentence and remand for new sentencing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Smrz exercised his right to a jury trial in response to the State's charge that he had
failed to register as a sex offender after coming to Idaho to establish residence. (See R., pp.55-56
(the Information filed against Mr. Smrz).) The State presented evidence that showed Mr. Smrz
kept some of his property at a house in Payette, Idaho, and that several people had seen him
frequently at that house, and argued that showed Mr. Smrz had, in fact, moved to Idaho. (See
generally Jury Trial Tr.) 1

Mr. Smrz countered that, despite frequent visits to Payette, his

1

While the transcripts are all contained in a single volume, the page numbers reset for the
transcript of each new hearing. As such, the name of the hearing listed in the electronic
document is included in citations to the transcript. "Motion Hearing Transcript" refers to the
motion hearing held on April 5, 2019.

1

residence remained in Ontario, Oregon. (See, e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.456, Ls.11-22.) In support of
that defense, he (representing himself) presented the testimony of Jeanette Buck, the owner of
the house in Payette. Ms. Buck testified that, while she did store some of Mr. Smrz's property
(e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.305, Ls.20-25), and while he did help with work around her house
(e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.312, Ls.8-12), Mr. Smrz did not actually live there. (Jury Trial Tr., p.303,

Ls.1-3.)
Rather, Ms. Buck testified, Mr. Smrz would usually go back to his campsite on the
Oregon side of the river after visiting her. (E.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.345, Ls.8-23; see also Jury
Trial Tr., p.305, Ls.8-13 (Ms. Buck testifying that, sometimes, Mr. Smrz would stay on her back
porch if, for example, the weather was bad, but he would leave the next day).) She explained
that, based on the papers she had seen, he had registered himself as a homeless person in
Oregon. 2

(Jury Trial Tr., p.337, L.19 - p.338, L.8; compare Exhibits, pp.5-13 (registration

documents from Oregon submitted as exhibits by the State).)
On cross-examination, the State sought to explore Ms. Buck's relationship with
Mr. Smrz, which she said was a friendship that had lasted many years. (See Jury Trial Tr., p.355,
Ls.14-23.)

The State presented her with State's Exhibit 7, a copy of an affidavit she had

executed in relation to Mr. Smrz's original sex offense charge.
L.15 - p.357, L.11; see Exhibits, pp.21-22.)3

(See Jury Trial Tr., p.356,

When the State moved to admit that exhibit,

Mr. Smrz objected, arguing the affidavit, which was from 2003, was not relevant to the question
of whether he had been living at Ms. Buck's house in 2018. (Jury Trial Tr., p.359, Ls.9-16.)
The district court asked the prosecutor if the proposed relevance "would be impeachment?" and
2

The State presented testimony that suggested Mr. Smrz's registration in Oregon was not proper.
(See, e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.177, L.12 - p.178, L.5.)
3
Citations to "Exhibits" refer to the PDF document with the name starting with "Exhibit Appeal
Volume 1 10-17-2019" and use the electronic page number.
2

the prosecutor answered that it was.

(Jury Trial Tr., p.359, Ls.17-18.)

The district court

overruled Mr. Smrz's objection on that basis and admitted Ms. Buck's affidavit. (Jury Trial
Tr., p.359, Ls.19-21.)
The State proceeded to question Ms. Buck about the contents of her affidavit, and
specifically, its reference to an incident where Mr. Smrz's prior attorney had filed a complaint
with the State Bar which had alleged that Ms. Buck had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law in her efforts to assist with Mr. Smrz's prior case. (Jury Trial Tr., p.359, L.23 - p.360, L.20.)
The prosecutor acknowledged that Ms. Buck had also asserted she had not ever represented
herself as an attorney, and he assumed that denial was true. (Jury Trial Tr., p.360, Ls.21-24.)
However, the prosecutor proceeded to challenge Ms. Buck's credibility, asking if she had been
trying to help Mr. Smrz back then because of their friendship, and if she was doing the same for
him now. (Jury Trial Tr., p.360, L.25 - p.361, L.8.) Despite Ms. Buck's testimony, the jury
found Mr. Smrz guilty as charged. (R., p.119.)
When scheduling the sentencing hearing, the district court told Mr. Smrz that "the way
the statute reads, I cannot consider probation if you don't do, if you don't participate in the presentence investigation.

That's the way it's set up.

If you don't participate in that, I can't

consider probation. Its as simple as that." (Jury Trial Tr., p.468, L.22 - p.469 L. 1.) Mr. Smrz
questioned that statement, asking if he still had the right to not participate in the presentence
evaluation and noting that he had exercised that right in his previous case. (Jury Trial Tr., p.469,
L.6 - p.470, L.8; see Exhibits, pp.1-2 (the prior judgment of conviction noting Mr. Smrz's
decision to not participate in the presentence process).) The district court confirmed that was his
right to not participate, but "[i]f you chose not to, I cannot consider probation. I'm just telling
you that." (Jury Trial Tr., p.469, Ls.20-24.)

3

Mr. Smrz submitted some answers to the presentence evaluation but ultimately decided
not to participate further. (Con£ Exh., p.7.) 4 Nevertheless, the presentence evaluator was able to
compile various relevant information based on other sources and submit a written report.
(See Conf. Exh., p.7; see generally Conf. Exh., pp.1-13.) Later, through appointed counsel,
Mr. Smrz explained there had been a misunderstanding as to the nature of the evaluation in the
initial presentence process, and so, requested the district court renew the order for a presentence
report as well as order a full psychological evaluation. (Motion Hearing Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.10,
L.7.) However, as the district court subsequently explained, Mr. Smrz ultimately refused to
participate in those evaluations without his attorney present. (Sentencing Tr., p.8, Ls.12-14.)
The district court decided to proceed with sentencing without those evaluations. (Sentencing
Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.2.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Smrz, through counsel, requested a sentence of time
served, or alternatively, a period of retained jurisdiction. 5 (Sentencing Tr., p.20, Ls.20-25.) The
district court rejected those recommendations, imposing and executing a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, instead. (Sentencing Tr., p.28, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Smrz filed a notice of
appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.151, 213.)

4

Citations to "Con£ Exhs." refer to the PDF document with the name starting with "Confidential
Exhibit Appeal Volume 1 10-17-2019" and use the electronic page number.
5
In response to the district court's question, Mr. Smrz noted that the judge in "his other case"
had said he did not think Mr. Smrz was an eligible candidate for probation. (Jury Trial
Tr., p.469, Ls.2-7.) Presumably, this was the judge for Mr. Smrz's pending case in Oregon. (See
Sentencing Tr., p.20, Ls.12-16 (defense counsel noting that Mr. Smrz had pending charges in
Oregon).)
4

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence of a specific, remote
instance of conduct to impeach Ms. Buck's credibility in violation ofl.R.E. 608(b).

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by telling Mr. Smrz it statutorily could not
consider probation unless he participated in the presentence process.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Extrinsic Evidence Of A Specific, Remote Instance Of
Conduct To Impeach Ms. Buck's Credibility In Violation Ofl.R.E. 608(b)

A.

Standard Of Review
Whether to admit evidence under I.R.E. 608 is a matter left to the district court's

discretion. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91 (1993); State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 710
(Ct. App. 2013). The district court abuses its discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue
as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently
with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). In this case, the district court did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards set forth in I.R.E. 608(b) in admitting
Ms. Buck's affidavit as extrinsic evidence to attack her credibility.

B.

Ms. Buck's Fifteen-Year-Old Affidavit From A Prior Case Was Nothing More Than
Inadmissible Extrinsic Evidence Used To Impeach Her Character For Truthfulness
Rule of Evidence 608(b) declares: "Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609,

extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to
attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness."

As the Court of Appeals has

explained, extrinsic evidence is '"evidence that is calculated to impeach a witness's credibility,
adduced by means other than cross-examination of the witness,"' including "'evidence in
documents and recordings and the testimony of other witnesses."' Bergerud, 155 Idaho at 710
n.2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (8th ed.2004)). Additionally, the older the extrinsic
evidence is, the less probative it actually is toward character for truthfulness and, "' [a ]t some

6

point it becomes so remote that it no longer tends to make a fact of consequence ... more
probable or less probable' and therefore, is inadmissible because it is not relevant under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 401." State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Roeh v.

Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1987) (specifically evaluating whether evidence of behavior
some nine years past was admissible under I.R.E. 608).
Mr. Smrz specifically invoked the remoteness aspect of the analysis under I.R.E. 608(b)
by objecting to Ms. Buck's affidavit on the basis that it was fifteen years old and had no
relevance to whether he was living in her house in 2018. (Jury Trial Tr., p.359, Ls.13-16.) The
only basis on which the State proffered that affidavit, which was extrinsic evidence under

Bergerud, was to attack Ms. Buck's credibility. (Jury Trial Tr., p.359, Ls.17-18.) As such, the
district court erred by overruling Mr. Smrz's objection to that affidavit under the plain language
of I.R.E. 608(b ).

IL
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Telling Mr. Smrz It Statutorily Could Not Consider
Probation Unless He Participated In The Presentence Process

A.

Standard Of Review
A district court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982). As discussed in Section I(A), supra, the district
court abuses its discretion if, inter alia, it fails to recognize the full scope of its discretion or it
acts inconsistent with the applicable legal standards. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863-64.

7

B.

By Misunderstanding The Relevant Statute, The District Court Erroneously Narrowed
The Scope Oflts Sentencing Discretion And Tainted The Entire Sentencing Process
While setting the sentencing process in motion, the district court declared it was

statutorily prevented from considering probation "if you don't participate in a pre-sentence
investigation."

(Jury Trial Tr., p.468, Ls.22-24.)

The district court appears to have been

referring to LC. § 20-220, which provides, in relevant portion:
When a probation and parole officer is available to the court, no defendant shall
be placed on probation until a written report of investigation by a parole and
probation officer shall have been presented to and considered by the court, and no
defendant charged with a felony or indictable offense shall be released under
suspension of sentence without such investigation.
LC. § 20-220. By its plain language, that statute does not require the defendant's participation in
the presentence process, only that a written presentence report be provided to the district court.
Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, the presentence report "relies greatly
on information already available in public records, such as educational background, residence
history and employment information."

Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006).

Thus, the

presentence investigator can gather relevant information from those other sources and still
provide the written report required under LC. § 20-220 even if the defendant decides not to
participate in the presentence process. In that case, LC. § 20-220 would not prevent the district
court from considering probation as a sentencing option.
To hold otherwise would actually render LC. § 20-220 unconstitutional because it would
cause that statute to infringe on every defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., State v.

Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 324 (2012) (reiterating that the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right
to not participate in the presentence process by holding "the defendant may waive the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to submit to a psychological evaluation
without waiving it with respect to participation in the PSI."). Specifically, the district court's

8

reading of LC. § 20-220 would automatically place every defendant in the classic penalty
scenario - forcing them to choose between waiving their right to not participate in the
presentence evaluation or being sent to prison based on the decision to remain silent. Compare
State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that the threat to either
participate in parole hearings or be deemed ineligible for parole qualified as the classic penalty
scenario).

Of course, the courts strive to read a statute in a way that renders the statute

constitutional. E.g., State v. Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 744 (2001). Since the district court's
understanding of LC. § 20-220 would fail to accomplish that goal, it should be rejected.
Therefore, the district court could, in fact, consider probation in this case even though
Mr. Smrz chose not to participate in the presentence evaluation process. This is particularly true
because the presentence evaluator actually prepared a written report as required by LC. § 20-220
based on other sources of information. (See Conf. Exhs., p.7; see generally Conf. Exh., pp.1-13.)
As such, the district court's statement to Mr. Smrz - that it would not consider probation "if you
don 't participate in a pre-sentence investigation" based on its misreading of the relevant statute
(Jury Trial Tr., p.468, Ls.22-24 (emphasis added)) - represents an inappropriate restriction on the
scope of its sentencing discretion. Compare State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2011)
(vacating the defendant's sentence because the district court's statement at a hearing on the
defendant's motion for leniency demonstrated it did not understand the full scope of its
discretion when it initially imposed his sentence).
Therefore, this case should be remanded for new a new sentencing hearing based on a
new presentence report, one in which Mr. Smrz has an unencumbered opportunity to decide

9

whether to participate. 6

Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) ("When the

discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error oflaw, the role of the appellate court
is to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings.").

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smrz respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for a
new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the sentence and remand this
case for new sentencing.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRD/eas

6

If Mr. Smrz were to decide to not participate in the presentence evaluation on remand, this case
should be reassigned to different judge for sentencing, since the current judge has already heard
and considered the tainted responses Mr. Smrz gave as a result of the erroneous statement
requiring his participation.
10

